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The Subprime Crisis and the Link between Consumer
Financial Protection and Systemic Risk
Erik F. Gerding
This Article argues that the current global financial crisis, which was
first called the “subprime crisis,” demonstrates the need to revisit the division between financial regulations designed to protect consumers from excessively risky loans and safety-and-soundness regulations intended to protect financial markets from the collapse of financial institutions. Consumer
financial protection can, and must, serve a role not only in protecting individuals from excessive risk, but also in protecting markets from systemic
risk. Economic studies indicate it is not merely high rates of defaults on
consumer loans, but highly correlated defaults that create risks for lenders
and investors in asset-backed securities. Consumer financial regulations
can mitigate these risks.
The Article argues:
x “predatory lending” can constitute a collective action failure by
lenders;
x consumer behavioral biases may frustrate attempts to mitigate risk
to purchasers of asset-backed securities that focus solely on improving
information on the risks of underlying consumer loans; but,
x consumer financial rules that take into account these biases and address the “menu design” of consumer loan choices may not only protect consumers, but make the risks of consumer defaults more predictable.
The Article also draws tentative conclusions on the implications of the
link between consumer protection and systemic risk for the institutional
reform of financial regulation by:
xsuggesting that a diverse set of regulators may remedy high correlations of consumer lending practices and the risks posed by highly correlated consumer default; and
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xarguing against federal preemption of state consumer regulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a historical division in financial regulation between
regulations designed to protect consumers and regulations intended to protect financial markets from the collapse of financial institutions. This Article argues that the current global financial crisis, which was first called the
“subprime crisis,” demonstrates the need to revisit this division. More particularly, this Article argues that consumer financial protection can, and
must, serve a role not only in protecting individuals from excessive risk, but
also in protecting markets from systemic risk. This additional role for consumer financial protection provides additional, novel support for promoting
vigorous and diverse consumer regulations.
This Article defines consumer financial protection laws and regulations as legal rules designed to prevent individual borrowers from taking on
1
excessive risk. These rules address lending practices that are sometimes
labeled as unfair, abusive, or predatory, and are often justified on efficiency
2
grounds. For example, consumer financial protection laws may address
either information asymmetries that prevent consumers from understanding

1
See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008)
(proposing a new financial regulator to protect consumers from risk posed by credit products). Consumer financial law covers a broad range of concerns, many of which lie beyond the scope of this Article. For example, this Article does not address financial laws or regulations intended to:

x

ensure wide consumer access to credit (including regulations that either combat racial discrimination by lenders that denies consumers credit or address the fairness of private credit reports
on consumers);

x

govern consumer banking and payment transactions;

x
x

address debt collection or foreclosure practices; or
regulate consumer bankruptcy.

Nevertheless, lender practices in these areas might also contribute to the phenomenon that is the
subject of this article – excessive consumer defaults that threaten the solvency of financial institutions.
More particularly, this Article focuses on consumer credit products and consumer lending practices that
lead to a high level of market-wide consumer defaults that are both unpredictable and highly correlated.
See infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
2
E.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002) (arguing that predatory lending represents a
market failure).
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3

the risk of a particular loan, or behavioral biases and cognitive limitations
4
that cause consumers to act against their long-term self interest.
As Part II.B explains, a separate set of financial laws and regulations
address systemic risk. Scholars have defined systemic risk as the risk of
5
market-wide losses or the breakdown of financial markets. Because systemic risk threatens the entire market, diversification does not adequately
6
protect investors. To address systemic risk, financial regulations focus on
7
the “safety and soundness” of financial institutions. By ensuring the financial health of institutions, systemic risk regulations attempt to protect finan8
cial markets from the collapse of a significant institution.
There is a tension between the objectives of protecting consumers and
ensuring the financial health of individual financial institutions. As Professor Adam Levitin notes, lending practices that extract additional value from
9
consumers strengthen the balance sheets of lenders. This means that efforts to clamp down on lending practices to protect consumers could adversely impact the finances of financial institutions.
But, there is little empirical evidence that consumer protection efforts
have ever threatened the stability of a financial institution to a degree that
increases systemic risk. In fact, this Article argues that consumer financial
protection is not antithetical to, but, in fact, represents a critical tool in mitigating systemic risk. When widespread consumer credit products or lending practices induce high levels of consumer default, the safety and sound-

3
E.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 5 (arguing that market for consumer credit fails when
consumers are not optimally informed); Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole
Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181,
181-82 (2008) (noting that Truth in Lending Act was intended to address information asymmetries that
prevented consumers from understanding loan terms).
4
E.g., Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory
Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707 (2006) (using theories from behavioral economics to explain predatory lending).
Many consumer financial protection laws are also plainly grounded in paternalism. Cf. Joshua D.
Wright, Behavioral Law and Economics, Paternalism, and Consumer Contracts: an Empirical Perspective, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 470 (2007) (challenging empirical foundations of behavioral critiques of
consumer credit markets).
5
George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, What is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators
Retard or Contribute to It, 7 INDEP. REV. 371, 371 (2003) (defining systemic risk as “the risk of a breakdown in an entire system, as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or components”). See also
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO L.J. 193 (2008).
6
Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 200.
7
See Adam Feibelman, Commercial Lending and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 75
U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 967 (2007) (equating banking law concerns with “safety and soundness” of banks
with systemic risk).
8
Kaufman & Scott, supra note 5, at 372, 385 (discussing regulations designed to prevent chain
failures of financial institutions).
9
Adam Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. REG. __
(forthcoming 2009).
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ness of financial institutions can be threatened. Systemic risk can thus
arise when consumer defaults threaten either one important financial institution (and that failure, in turn, threatens other institutions) or a number of
11
institutions simultaneously.
Both pathways to systemic risk point to a need to refine when consumer default can lead to market-wide losses; it is not merely a high incidence of consumer default that poses systemic risk. Instead, systemic risk
becomes a problem when the level of consumer default exceeds the predictions of financial institutions and when these consumer defaults are highly
correlated. If financial institutions underestimate consumer defaults, they
12
cannot manage risk effectively. Risk management is similarly frustrated
by highly correlated consumer defaults; high correlation of defaults within a
financial institution’s portfolio undermines diversification as defaulting
13
loans are not offset by loans that continue to repay. High correlation of
defaults across a market means that multiple financial institutions face
14
losses at the same time. The securitization of consumer loans both makes
15
predicting the consequences of consumer default much more difficult and
16
increases the dangers of high default correlations; securitization thus mag-

10

Professor Levitin recognizes this potential confluence.
These two potential links between consumer default and systemic risk correspond with two of
the pathways for systemic risk described by Professors Kaufman and Scott. Among the three ways that
systemic risk can arise, include a failure of one important institution leading to a chain reaction of failures by other inter-connected institutions and failures by multiple institutions that arise from an external
“shock” and “similarities in third-party risk exposures” among those institutions. Kaufman & Scott,
supra note 5, at 372-73.
12 If a financial institution could adequately measure the risks posed by consumer defaults either
directly to the institution itself or indirectly to the institution’s counterparties, then the institution could
hedge appropriately. See Erik F. Gerding, The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and
the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (analyzing challenges faced by
financial institution risk models in measuring impact of defaults on underlying mortgages on assetbacked securities).
13 Id. See also Joshua D. Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 3
(2009) (describing how correlation among losses on underlying assets undermines efficient risk spreading in securitization and can lead to severe errors in estimating losses on asset-backed securities); Eva
Porras, The Role of Correlation in the Current Credit Ratings Squeeze (IE Business School, Working
Paper No. WP08-10, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134488
(analyzing role of default correlations in subprime portfolios in wave of ratings downgrades of assetbacked securities in current crisis); Adrian M. Cowan & Charles D. Cowan, Default Correlation: an
Empirical Investigation of a Subprime Lender, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 753 (2004) (finding high default
correlation in portfolio of single subprime lender studied).
14 See Kaufman & Scott, supra note 5, at 373 (describing systemic risk arising from financial
institutions with correlated exposures to third-party defaults); cf. Mark Carey, Dimensions of Credit Risk
and their Relationship to Economic Capital Requirements, PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: WHAT WORKS
AND WHAT DOESN’T (Frederic S. Mishkin ed., 2001) (detailing how errors in assumption on credit risk
correlations in financial risk models that would be used to set regulatory capital under Basel Accords
may lead to significant errors).
15 See Gerding, supra note 12.
16 Coval et al., supra note 13.
11
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nifies the consequences for systemic risk of consumers taking on excessive17
ly risky loans.
The current financial crisis, which started with subprime mortgages
and spread to financial institutions that held securities backed by those
18
mortgages, provides stark evidence of the link between the failure of consumer financial protection and threats to entire financial markets. Just before the crisis, U.S. bank regulators began to recognize the possible risks
posed by subprime lending and securitization to the safety and soundness of
19
financial institutions, but the severity of the financial crisis shows that
regulators need to move beyond baby steps and redouble efforts to address
systemic risk through consumer protection.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II sketches the basic division in
U.S. financial regulation between laws designed to protect consumers and
those designed to mitigate systemic risk; Part III describes the rise of sub20
prime lending, particularly subprime mortgage lending, and how the secu21
ritization fueled that rise; Part III underscores the risks posed by highly
correlated consumer defaults in subprime markets and also provides a brief
explanation of how the financial crisis started with defaults in subprime
22
mortgages and spread to financial institutions; Part IV argues that the current financial crisis demonstrates the need to enlist consumer financial protection in efforts to mitigate systemic risk and that policies based on improving the “menu design” of consumer borrowing options can prove par-

17 Cf. Rob Nijskens & Wolf Wagner, Credit Risk Transfer Activities and Systemic Risk: How
Banks Became Less Risky Individually but Posed Greater Risks to the Financial System at the Same
Time (Dec. 23, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1319689 (positing that credit risk transfers by financial institutions, including via
securitization, counterintuitively may increase systemic risk by making bank risk profiles more correlated with one another).
18 See infra Part III (provides a thumbnail sketch of the beginnings of the current global financial
crisis in the subprime mortgage market).
19 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 2, at 1290-91. As Professors Engel and McCoy note, “In
January 2001, federal banking regulators increased the capital requirements for all institutions with
subprime lending programs that equaled or exceeded 25% of their tier one regulatory capital.” Id. at
1291, n.155 (citing BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ET AL., EXPANDED
GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 2, 5-6 (2001)). However, it is unclear how diligently
bank examiners followed this examination guidance.
Professors McCoy and Engel also note that regulators proposed several rules that would require
subprime lenders to collect data on their loans or mortgages. Engel & McCoy, supra note 2, at 1291,
n.155. Finally, bank regulators issued interagency guidance on capital requirements for financial institutions to cover risks posed by asset-backed securities held by those institutions. Id. (citing Federal Reserve System, Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, Capital Adequacy Guidelines, Capital Maintenance,
Capital Treatment of Recourse, Direct Credit Substitutes and Residual Interests in Asset Securitizations,
66 Fed. Reg. 59, 614 (Nov. 29, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
20 See infra Part III.A.
21 See infra Parts III.B (describing the mechanics of securitization) and III.C (describing how
securitization fueled subprime lending).
22 See infra Part III.C.
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23

ticularly valuable in fighting systemic risk; Part V analyzes the implications of employing consumer financial protection law as a tool to mitigate
systemic risk for the current debate over reorganizing financial regulators;
and Part VI concludes.
II. THE DIVIDE BETWEEN CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION AND
REGULATIONS ON SYSTEMIC RISK
The current structure of financial regulation treats the protection of
consumers from unfair lending practices and the protection of financial
markets from systemic risk as two distinct objectives. This division appears
both in different statutory and regulatory frameworks and in the allocation
of responsibility among and within different financial regulators. The following paragraphs provide just a sketch of this division.
A. Consumer Protection
An array of federal and state laws addresses protecting consumer borrowers from abusive, unfair or predatory lending practices. A basic distinction can be made between laws that regulate the substance of the consumer
loan terms and those that require that lenders make certain disclosure to
consumers. Substantive regulation of consumers has its origins in usury
24
statutes, which survive in state law. (But scholars have noted a dilution in
state usury prohibitions, due in part to the Supreme Court’s decision in
25
Marquette National Bank, which permits national banks to export the
26
usury law of the states in which they are chartered. This decision encouraged both lenders to relocate to states with higher or no interest rate ceilings
and states to dilute their usury laws, phenomena some scholars have de27
scribed as a “race-to-the bottom.” Moreover, state interest rate caps were
preempted by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-

23

See infra Part IV.F.
Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience
Distortion of American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1116-22 (2008) (surveying historical development of state usury laws in the United States through the present).
25 Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
26 Id. at 318-19. See Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 148 (2004)
(analyzing how banks have been able to export the usury law of the state in which they are chartered
because of Marquette decision). Professor Barr also notes that regulations of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency that assert federal preemption of state consumer protection laws have built
on the Marquette decision. Id.
27 Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory
Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 35-37 (2005). See also Elizabeth R. Schlitz, The Amazing, Elastic, EverExpanding Exportation Doctrine and its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518
(2004).
24
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28

trol Act, a statute that was critical in spurring the growth of subprime lend29
ing.
Federal consumer financial protection focuses primarily on required
disclosure to consumers of the lending terms. Most notably, the Truth in
30
31
Lending Act and related federal regulations set forth detailed standards
for disclosures by lenders in consumer credit transactions.
B. Systemic Risk
Federal and state regulations of banks and other financial institutions
address systemic risk by limiting risk-taking by those institutions. Systemic
risk regulations include regulations that focus on the “safety and soundness” of banks and other financial institutions (e.g., insurance companies)
32
whose collapse may have broad spillover effects on financial markets.
These risk regulations fall into several broad categories, including the following:
x regulations that limit financial institutions to particular lines of
business to shield them from excessive losses and to allow regula33
tors to better assess the risks that the institutions face;
x restrictions on the types of investments that financial institutions
may make, which include prohibitions on investments in real es34
35
tate and riskier classes of securities, such as equity;
x prudential restrictions on the number of loans to certain types of
36
borrowers; and
x capital requirements for financial institutions.

37

28

Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market, 88 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 31, 38 (Jan./Feb. 2006), available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/06/01/ChomPennCross.pdf.
30 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2008).
31 Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2008).
32 See Feibelman, supra note 7, at 967.
33 E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2008) (enumerating powers of national banks).
34 E.g., 12. U.S.C. § 29 (2008) (restricting ability of national banks to invest in real estate).
35 E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2008) (specifying categories of securities investments which national
banks are permitted to make).
36 For example, federal banking laws limit the loans that banks may have outstanding to one
borrower. 12 U.S.C. §§ 84, 1464(u) (2008); 12 C.F.R. § 32.1(b) (2008). Another set of laws restrict a
bank’s loans to other depositary institutions to prevent the collapse of one institution from threatening
others. 12 U.S.C. § 371b-2 (2008); 12 C.F.R. § 206 (2008).
37 Requiring that institutions maintain a certain amount of capital to match the risks on their
balance sheet ensures that they have a cushion against losses that would push the institutions towards
insolvency and threaten their depositors, creditors, and other institutions. Capital requirements are a
centerpiece of federal banking regulation. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831(o)(c)(1) (requiring federal bank regulators to establish capital requirements for supervised banks). But capital requirements also feature
29
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These regulations are buttressed by the general powers of a regulator
38
to inspect financial institutions for safety and soundness and to revoke an
institution’s license, assume control of its operations, or shut it down if the
39
regulator finds concerns. Deposit insurance and other government guarantees of financial institutions provide yet another backstop against systemic
40
risk by mitigating the threat of bank runs. Yet, the moral hazard created
by this insurance means that the regulators providing the backstop must
41
actively use other regulations to restrict excessive risk-taking. Finally,
central banks attempt to mitigate systemic risk by serving as lenders of last
42
resort.
C. When a Regulator Has Both a Consumer Protection and Systemic
Risk Mission
A number of banking regulators have both consumer protection and
systemic risk mitigation (safety and soundness) in their statutory missions.
But, as Professor Levitin argues, these missions can conflict.
[T]he safety-and-soundness mission is incompatible with consumer
protection because practices that might be profitable and thus increase
banks’ safety-and-soundness might also be profitable and thus increase banks’ safety-and-soundness might also be abusive and unfair
to consumers. For example, banks might not engage in the most strenuous anti-fraud practices because it might not be as profitable as al-

regulation of other types of financial institutions. For example, the SEC imposes capital requirements
on registered broker-dealers. Net Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1
(2009).
38 E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 4517 (2008) (mandating annual examination of government sponsored entities for safety and soundness). See also Tamar Frankel, Regulating the Financial Markets by Examinations,
(B.
U.
Sch.
L.
Working
Paper
No.
09-08,
2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1339913 (arguing that securities regulators should
use regulatory examinations similar to safety and soundness examinations by federal bank regulators to
mitigate the risk of asset price bubbles and financial market crashes).
39 E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1 (2008) (requiring federal bank regulators to set safety-and-soundness
standards for insured depositary institutions); § 1818 (setting standards for termination of deposit insurance status); § 1831o (setting standards for “prompt corrective action” by insured depositary institutions). See also Frankel, at supra note 38.
40 See Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 210. But cf. Kaufman & Scott, supra note 5, at 381 (arguing
that deposit insurance is unnecessary and counterproductive in mitigating systemic risk).
41 RIK W. HAFER, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: AN ENCYLOPEDIA 270-71 (2005) (analyzing
potential moral hazard created by deposit insurance). For a few of the statutory provisions that address
moral hazard with respect to insured institutions, see supra note 39.
42 For an economic analysis of this lender of last resort role and the concept of systemic risk in
general, see Olivier De Bandt & Phillip Hartmann, Systemic Risk in Banking: a Survey, in FINANCIAL
CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 249, 260 (Charles Goodhart & Gerhard Illing
eds., 2002).
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lowing a certain level of fraud. . . . Safety-and-soundness and con43
sumer protection would thus push for different regulatory outcomes.
He further argues that, faced with this conflict, bank regulators often
give priority to protecting against systemic risk.
Placing the two missions together in a single agency ensures that one
will trump the other, and historically consumer protection has not won
out. . . . Federal banking regulators have the authority to regulate for
consumer protection, but are not motivated to do so, in part because of
44
its conflict with their safety-and-soundness mission. . . .
Professor Levitin acknowledges that there may be an alignment between consumer protection and safety-and-soundness missions because
45
excessive defaults may threaten financial institutions.
Nevertheless, Professor Levitin maintains that the potential conflict
between the two missions explains why federal bank regulators have either
refrained from fully enforcing consumer protection laws and regulations in
their mandate or, in some cases, actively worked to roll back consumer protection laws. As an example of a regulator that both failed to enforce and
actively undermined consumer protection laws, Professor Levitin cites the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). In particular, he faults
the Comptroller of the Currency for asserting that federal banking laws
46
preempt state consumer financial protections. (The OCC won a major
victory in its efforts to preempt state consumer regulations, in 2007, when
47
the Supreme Court ruled in Watters v. Wachovia Bank that state regulation
of a state-chartered mortgage subsidiary of a national bank was preempted
48
by the National Bank Act. ).

43 Levitin, supra note 9, at 19. Professor Levitin explains that the interests of banks and investors
in preventing fraud may diverge with the following economic analysis: From a bank’s perspective, there
is an optimal level of fraud, which is not zero. “After a certain point, the cost of preventing the marginal
fraud outweighs its benefit. From a safety and soundness perspective, a bank should not overinvest in
anti-fraud security. But from a consumer perspective, the optimal level of fraud is likely zero, especially
if consumers bear the risk of fraud loss.” Id.
44 Id.
45 Id., n.58. Levitin notes, however, that this alignment may no longer exist. First, banks no
longer bear the risk of excessive defaults on consumer loans when they sell those loans to securitization
vehicles. Second, defaults on some loans, such as credit card debt, generate profits for banks through
penalties. Id. (citing Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweatbox” of Credit Card Debt,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375).
46 See Levitin, supra note 9.
47 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
48 See Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Damming Watters: Channeling the Power of Federal Preemption of
State Consumer Banking Laws, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 893 (2008) (criticizing Watters as part of larger
legal movement to preempt state banking regulation). But, perhaps, the most important milestone in
federal preemption occurred in 1980, when the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 preempted state interest rate caps; this legislation represented a critical piece in the

444

FIU Law Review

[4:435
49

Scholars have echoed Professor Levitin’s analysis and noted that other federal banking regulators that have both consumer protection and safety
and soundness missions have emphasized the latter mission at the expense
50
of the former.
III. SUBPRIME LENDING, SECURITIZATION AND THE START OF THE CRISIS
A. The Rise of Subprime Mortgage Lending
The subprime crisis revealed the dangers in separating consumer financial protection from addressing systemic risk. As detailed below, the
crisis began with consumer defaults on so-called subprime mortgages.
“Subprime mortgages” can have several definitions, but are often distinguished from “prime” mortgages by significantly higher upfront and continuing costs (including fees and interest rate payments) due to the lower
51
creditworthiness of the borrowers.
The last fifteen years witnessed a
52
boom in subprime mortgage lending.
Many of the mortgages offered to subprime borrowers (and offered to
other borrowers) had complex interest rate features. A notable category of
these complex mortgages, adjustable rate mortgages (“ARMs”), offered
buyers low fixed rates on an introductory or “teaser” basis, with interest
53
rates converting to a floating, market-based interest rate after a few years.
ARMs and other “exotic” mortgages would cost borrowers substantial54
ly more over the life of the mortgages than fixed rate mortgages. ARMs

beginning of the subprime mortgage market. See Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and
Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009).
49 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 90-95.
50 Id. at 94-95 (criticizing Federal Reserve’s poor performance in consumer protection due to
focus on safety and soundness mission); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Role of Central Banks in Bank
Supervision in the United States and the United Kingdom, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 411, 427 (2003) (commenting on Federal Reserve prioritizing safety and soundness).
51 Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 29, at 32. These costs can be broken down
as follows:
Upfront costs include application fees, appraisal fees, and other fees associated with originating a
mortgage. The continuing costs include mortgage insurance payments, principle and interest payments,
late fees and fines for delinquent payments, and fees levied by a locality (such as property taxes and
special assessments). Id.
Other definitions of subprime loans focus on lower creditworthiness of borrowers as measured by
lower credit rating scores. E.g. Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 08-25,
2 Sept. 30,2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1276047.
52 See Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 29, at 36-40.
53 Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 123, 144 (2007). See also Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics, and Psychology of Subprime
Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (positing that the two defining features of
subprime mortgage contracts are cost deferral for borrowers and complexity in terms).
54 See Bar-Gill, supra note 53. The costs to consumers of ARM loans were recognized in legal
scholarship over two decades ago. E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The
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also meant that borrowers bore significant interest rate risk; if interest rates
increased after the teaser period expired, then the required interest pay55
ments would rise, potentially beyond the ability of the borrower to repay.
Rising market interest rates would also foreclose the ability of the borrower
to refinance or sell the house for more than the value of the mortgage (as
56
higher interest rates would decrease the number of buyers in the market).
The dramatic increase in the lending of these more complex mortgages
coincided with a boom in other forms of consumer lending, such as credit
card products, both to subprime borrowers and more creditworthy individu57
als. Many of these other credit products also contained complex terms,
which allowed lenders to reset interest rates or charge various “hidden” fees
58
and penalties.
Consumer law scholars have argued that mortgage and other consumer
lenders used the complexity of ARMs and consumer credit products to shift
59
interest rate risk to, and extract additional revenue from, consumers.
These scholars argued lenders exploited not only informational asymme60
tries, but the behavioral biases of consumers as well. Consumers make
many decisions in a manner inconsistent with the rational actor models of
neoclassical economics, these scholars contend; instead, consumers exhibit
cognitive limitations and take mental shortcuts that cause them to miscalcu61
late financial risks. According to these scholars, these behavioral biases
caused consumer borrowers to agree to provisions in mortgages and other
62
consumer debt contracts that they otherwise might not have.
B. Securitization
Consumer lending came to have a more direct effect on capital markets because of the advent of securitization. Securitization also means that
Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamices of the Home Sale
and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1131 (1984).
55 See Bar-Gill, supra note 53.
56 See id.
57 For a discussion of rising levels of consumer debt, see Teresa A. Sullivan, Less Stigma or More
Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59
STAN. L. REV. 213, 229-32 (2006); TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS:
AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000).
58 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 26-53 (analyzing market failures in consumer credit
products other than mortgages).
59 See Bar-Gill, supra note 53.
60 See id.
61 See Willis, supra note 4, at 754-804 (cataloging behavioral biases afflicting mortgage borrowers).
62 See Bar-Gill, supra note 53; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 26-53 (analyzing market
failures in consumer credit products other than mortgages). For other recent scholarship on the effects
of behavioral biases on real estate investments, see Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U.
L. REV. 1047 (2008); Markus K. Brunnermeier & Christian Julliard, Money Illusion and Housing Frenzies, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 135 (2008).
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risks inherent in consumer lending translate more directly into systemic
risk.
Securitization represents a process by which loans, mortgages, and
other credit products that generate predictable future cash streams from
borrowers are pooled together and sold to an investment vehicle that then
63
issues securities to investors. The proceeds from the sale of the securities
64
fund the purchase of the loan pool by the investment vehicle. The assetbacked securities issued in a securitization are often themselves pooled and
securitized; this re-securitization of asset-backed securities can, and has
65
been, repeated many times over in an iterative fashion.
Lenders benefit from securitization in several ways. First, they can
convert long-term assets (such as mortgages) into short-term, extremely
liquid assets (i.e., cash). This can help address a mismatch that many lenders face between short-term liabilities and long-term assets, thereby ad66
dressing a concern of both investors and regulators. Second, lenders can
67
then channel the cash into new loans and increase their returns on capital.
Third, lenders can earn fees paid by the investment vehicle for continuing
68
to collect and enforce the loans on behalf of the vehicle (“servicing fees”).
Fourth, lenders use securitization to mitigate and diversify against credit
risk. By selling a portion of the loans they make, the lenders mitigate the
risk that they face of default on those loans, risk which might be overly
69
concentrated in certain geographic areas or market segments.
Securitization thus provides a mechanism to spread risks from lenders
to investors; through securitization, lenders offload credit risk from mortgages, credit card debts, student loans and other credit products to purchas70
ers of asset-backed securities.
Investors have been willing to bear these
risks because securitization offers both the rewards of investing in lucrative
71
consumer credit markets and the opportunity to diversify against risks.

63 For a primer on securitizations, see Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 135 (1994).
64 See id.
65 See Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON
SECURITIZATION 1, 15 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1997); Coval et al., supra note 13
(describing “CDO Squared” securitizations).
66 See MOORAD CHOUDHRY, CORPORATE BONDS AND STRUCTURED FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 297300 (2004).
67 See Simon Wolfe, Structural Effects of Asset-Backed Securitisation, 6 EUR. J. FIN. 353 (2000).
68 CHARLES AUSTIN STONE & ANNE ZISSU, THE SECURITIZATION MARKETS HANDBOOK:
STRUCTURES AND DYNAMICS OF MORTGAGE AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 45 (2005).
69 See CHOUDHRY, supra note 66, at 300.
70 See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership,
Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231 (2008) (describing risk spreading functions of CDOs, a type of securitization, and other financial instruments).
71 See CHOUDHRY, supra note 66, at 300.
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An investor in asset-backed securities can diversify against the credit
risk of consumer mortgages and other loans in three different ways. First,
the pooling of loans means that the risk of default on any one loan is offset
by the payments on non-defaulted loans. Second, securitization facilitates
diversification because a purchaser of an asset-backed security is only purchasing a piece of the risk of the mortgage pool. An investor can diversify
by balancing the other investments in its portfolio. Third, and in a related
vein, an investor can more finely tune the amount of risk in any investment
in asset-backed securities because these securities are often issued in different classes or tranches. Each tranche has a different priority in rights to
payments on the underlying loans, with senior tranches receiving payments
before junior classes are paid. Each tranche of a securitization thus offers a
72
different tradeoff between risk and interest rates (reward).
But, the success of diversification (and the efficiency of risk spreading
through securitization) rests on several assumptions. Among these assumptions is that the models used to price asset-backed securities adequately
73
measure the risks posed by the underlying loans. Furthermore, diversification depends on a low, constant, and predictable degree of correlation of
74
losses on underlying loans. Again, diversification depends in part on
losses from a default on some loans being offset by continued payments on
other loans. When defaults are highly correlated, it no longer rains, it
pours.
High default correlations on the assets underlying a securitization can
create extreme volatility in the losses to asset-backed securities and lead to
75
serious underestimation of risk. Studies have shown that individual sub76
prime lenders have high correlations of default in their loan portfolios and
that defaults among subprime borrowers are highly correlated (while de-

72

See Gerding, supra note 12.
See id.
74 See Coval et al., supra note 13. See also Porras, supra note 13.
75 See Coval et al., supra note 13 (detailing how small errors in the assumptions of securitization
models can lead to large miscalculations of losses for asset-backed securities with these miscalculations
compounded with every re-securitization of those securities); Porras, supra note 13; Gunter Löffler, The
Effects of Estimation Error on Measures of Portfolio Credit Risk, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 1427 (2003)
(providing statistical analysis that shows how default correlations can lead to errors in estimating credit
risk in investment portfolio); cf. Darrell Duffie et al., Frailty Correlated Default (Swiss Fin. Inst. Research,
Working
Paper
No.
08-44,
2008),
available
at
http://www.finance.ox.ac.uk/NR/rdonlyres/CF97FD7F-2BFB-41CE-B99AFF4DE0DEB9BB/0/DarrellDuffie.pdf (finding that standard risk measurement methods severely underestimate probability of default losses on portfolios of U.S. corporate debt, including CDOs, because of
hidden default correlations).
76 Adrian M. Cowan & Charles D. Cowan, Default Correlation: An Empirical Investigation of a
Subprime Lender, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 753 (2004) (finding high default correlation in portfolio of
single subprime lender studied).
73

448

FIU Law Review

[4:435

faults among more creditworthy borrowers have a much lower correla77
tion).
Correlation can also defeat diversification across an investor’s portfolio. When different securities in an investor’s portfolio (for example, different issuances of asset-backed securities) experience high—and highly
correlated—losses, that investor may lurch towards sudden financial col78
lapse. If there is a high degree of correlation among the portfolios of large
institutional investors, losses in one investment portfolio may presage mar79
ket-wide losses, which may cause many investors to sell assets, make
margin calls, and cut lending simultaneously.
C. The Connection between Securitization and Subprime Lending
Scholars have argued that securitization triggered the growth of sub80
prime mortgage lending (and other subprime consumer loans). When
lenders could sell the mortgages they originated, they no longer bore the
full risk of borrower default and had less incentive to ensure that consumers
81
could repay the mortgages. Indeed, many mortgage lenders lowered underwriting standards and extended so-called low documentation (“low
doc”) loans that did not require documentary proof of a borrower’s em82
ployment or other important indicia of creditworthiness. Instead of ensur-

77 David K. Musto & Nicholas S. Souleles, A Portfolio View of Consumer Credit, 53 J.
MONETARY ECON. 59, 61-62 (2006) (positing that measuring default risk of consumer loans requires
determining covariance with aggregate consumer default rates and finding that “consumers with high
covariance risk tend to also have low credit scores (high default probabilities)”).
78 Insurers face a similar problem in ensuring that losses in their portfolio are not highly correlated. ZVI BODIE ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF INVESTMENTS 196 (Richard D. Irwin, 3d ed., 1998).
79 See supra notes 14, 17 and accompanying text. See generally Martin Hellwig, Systemic Risk in
the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis (Max Planck Inst. for
Research
on
Collective
Goods
Preprint
No.
2008/43,
2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1309442. Professor Hellwig analyzes in depth how
correlations in various levels of a securitization—from default correlations among underlying loans to
correlations in prices of asset-backed securities—can undermine diversification, lead to unexpectedly
large losses for financial institutions, and thus exacerbate systemic risk. He analyzes how these various
correlations frustrated risk modeling and contributed to the global financial crisis.
80 See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007); Christopher A. Peterson, Predatory Structured
Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185 (2007).
81 Frederic S. Mishkin, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, On “Leveraged
Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Meltdown,” Remarks at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, New
York, N.Y. (Apr. 8, 2005), availableathttp://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin
20080229a.htm (discussing incentive problems created by “originate-to-distribute” model).
82 Ann M. Burkhart, Real Estate Practice in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MO. L. REV. 1031,
1045-46 (2007); Alan N. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: How did it Happen and How will it
End?, 13 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 13 (2007) (presenting empirical data on low-documentation loans).
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ing the creditworthiness of borrowers, lenders had an incentive to enter new
83
markets, including the subprime market, to generate additional fees.
Fueled by securitization, the U.S. subprime mortgage market grew
from miniscule levels to $625 billion in 2005, when it represented one-fifth
84
of total annual mortgage originations. Economists have noted that the
subprime mortgage market depended heavily on steady increases in home
values, which enabled mortgage borrowers—who could not afford the
higher interest rates when their ARM (or other exotic mortgage) reset— to
85
either refinance or sell. Housing prices did rise fairly sharply from 1999
to 2005, with the boom in the last several years fueled in particular by sub86
prime lending.
Demand by investors for mortgage-backed securities
87
spurred additional mortgage lending. One group of economists describes
the interplay of securitization and subprime mortgage lending as a feedback
loop that created a housing bubble. They write:
A critical factor in the bubble was the interaction of financial engineering and deteriorating lending standards in real-estate markets,
which fed on each other to cause unsustainable price rises, and then
collapse. Financial market expansion and innovation provided new
funding sources and a demand for mortgages for securitization. This
required the easing of lending standards, which drove prices up. The
soaring housing prices were both an effect and a cause of too much
easing as the price rises supported the continued undermining of lend88
ing standards.

83 Engel & McCoy, supra note 80; Bar-Gill, supra note 53. Benjamin J. Keys, et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans (EFA 2008 Athens Meetings Paper,
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093137 (concluding securitization did lead to deterioration in credit screening).
84 Gregory A. Krohn & William R. Gruver, The Complexities of the Financial Turmoil of 2007
and 2008 9, (Oct. 7, 2008) (unpublished manuscript available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1282250&rec=1&srcabs=1273467).
85 Gorton, supra note 51, at 5-6. See also Michel G. Crouhy et al., The Subprime Credit Crisis of
07, (July 9, 2008) (unpublished manuscript available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1112467&rec=1&srcabs=1072304).
86 Krohn & Gruver, supra note 84. Some economists see housing price increases as driven by a
feedback loop that is psychological. See Robert J. Shiller, Understanding Recent Trends in House
Prices and Home Ownership (Yale Econ. Dep’t Working Paper No. 28, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017546 (describing evidence that housing price
increase stemmed from psychological feedback mechanism; increasing asset prices lured investors and
drove a speculative bubble).
87 Krohn & Gruver, supra note 84 (describing “shadow banking” system of securitization investors funding and driving subprime mortgage lending by non-banks); Engel & McCoy, supra note 80, at
137 (citing reports that excess demand by investors for asset-backed securities led to additional subprime securitizations and lax diligence by investors of credit risk).
88 Susan M. Wachter et al., Subprime Lending and Real Estate Markets, in MORTGAGE & REAL
ESTATE FIN. (Stefania Perrucci ed., 2008). But see Geetesh Bhardwaj & Rajdeep Sengupta, Where’s the
Smoking Gun? A Study of Underwriting Standards for US Subprime Mortgages (Fed. Reserve Bank of
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The rapid growth of the subprime mortgage market coincided with
89
consolidation of market share among lenders. One study found a correlation in subprime markets between increases in competition among lenders
90
and decreases in underwriting standards. As underwriting standards declined, subprime mortgage lenders were increasingly making the same
types of riskier loans; from 2001 to 2006, the percentage of subprime mortgage originations that constituted:
x

Low-documentation (or no-documentation) loans increased from
28.5% to 50.8%;

x

ARMs jumped from 73.8% to 91.3%;

x

Interest-only mortgages increased from 0% to 22.8%.

91

Together, these trends indicate that lenders were making the same
types of loans in the same markets and simultaneously lowering underwriting standards. This correlation of lending practices may explain (or exacerbate) the default correlations that studies have found in subprime loan port92
folios. Again, high default correlations in underlying mortgage loans can
translate into unexpectedly and significantly higher defaults in securities
93
backed by those loans.
D. The Crisis Spreads
The current financial crisis exposed the dangers in these assumptions.
The crisis has numerous causes and has unfolded (and continues to unfold)
in incredibly complex ways that will occupy economists for decades. The
following paragraphs present merely a thumbnail sketch of the crisis to
highlight how consumer mortgage defaults threatened the safety of financial institutions and created massive systemic risk.
The subprime crisis began in 2007, when defaults on ARMs began rising as teaser rates on ARMs expired and many subprime borrowers were
94
unable to make payments at the higher reset rate. Rising market interest
St.
Louis,
Working
Paper
No.
2008-036A,
2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1286106 (finding no deterioration of lending standards after 2004).
89 Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 29, at 40.
90 Giovanni Dell’Ariccia et al., Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Research, Discussion Paper No. DP6683, 2008), available
at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/rtf08rtmfs/aricciaiganlaeven.pdf.
91 Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Law and Economic Issues in Subprime Litigation (Harvard Law
School, John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 612, 2008), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ferrell_et_al_612.pdf.
92 See supra notes 13, 76, 77 and accompanying text.
93 Supra notes 13, 74, 75, 78 and accompanying text.
94 Gretchen Morgenson, Home Loans: A Nightmare Grows Darker, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at
C1.
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rates cut off the exit options for borrowers by both making refinancing prohibitively expensive and drying up the resale market; home prices began to
95
level or drop in many markets after years of continuous gains. Waves of
96
defaults by mortgage borrowers followed.
The wave of defaults swelled enough to affect even senior classes of
97
mortgage-backed securities. Defaults on asset-backed securities triggered
guarantees and credit insurance policies, and unprepared guarantors and
98
credit insurers themselves threatened to falter.
Growing losses for financial institutions on mortgages and mortgagedbacked securities created two aftershocks. First, lenders cut back on mortgage and other lending, which drove market interest rates higher and started
a credit crunch. Higher interest rates created a feedback loop and worsened
99
default rates on ARMs.
Second, the plummeting of the value of asset-backed securities forced
many financial institutions to make substantial write-downs of assets on
100
their balance sheets, a process that still continues. Yet the value of many
of these assets became extremely uncertain, as buyers for asset-backed se101
In addition, the iteration of securitization upon securities disappeared.
curitization meant that the default of one class of securitization cascaded
and caused losses in subsequent securitizations. But, the many layers of
securitization—CDOs backed by CDOs in an iterative chain—prevented
investors later in the securitization chain from calculating the risk they
102
faced from losses on assets earlier in the chain.

95 Id.; see also Jia Lynn Yang, How Bad is the Mortgage Crisis Going to Get?, CNNMONEY.COM,
Mar. 17, 2008, available at http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/14/news/economy/krugman_
subprime.fortune/index.htm.
96 Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, (Magazine),at 36.
97 Robert Stowe, Anatomy of a Meltdown, 68 MORTGAGE BANKING 38 (Oct. 1, 2007), available
at 2007 WLNR 21537515; Greg B. Cioffi, Collateralized Damage, DAILY DEAL, Feb 1, 2008, available
at 2008 WLNR 1910083.
98 Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Bond Insurer in Turmoil Turns to Familiar Lender, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2008, at C2.
99 Shawn Tully, Risk Returns with a Vengeance, FORTUNE, Sept. 3, 2007, at 50.
100 Charles Duhigg, A Trickle that Turned into a Torrent, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2008, at C1 (reporting that major banks are writing down 20% to 50% of the value of their assets due to losses from mortgage-backed securities).
101 Louise Story, A Values Debate (Not the Political Kind), N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at C1
(reporting on debate over whether mark to market rule in Financial Accounting Statement 157 was
leading to overstated write downs); see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Are Bean Counters to Blame?¸ N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2008, at C1.
102 Matthew Goldstein & David Henry, Bear Bets Wrong, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 22, 2007, at 50
(linking Bear Stearn’s deteriorating credit situation to the decline in value of “CDO squared” securities
it held).
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The write-down of assets began to affect the creditworthiness, real and
103
perceived, of many institutional investors. Many investors were forced to
104
sell asset-backed securities to improve their balance sheets, but they faced
a liquidity risk problem similar to that of holders of mortgages; the initial
depression of prices of asset-backed securities, combined with the volume
of sellers in the market in the same predicament, sent the prices of these
105
securities into a tailspin and dried up liquidity.
Creditors, including stock lending and derivative counter-parties, began worrying about the credit risk posed by many institutions and made
106
margin calls. Many large commercial and investment banks were forced
to seek emergency equity infusions to shore up their balance sheets, reas107
sure creditors, and meet regulatory capital requirements.
108
A few prominent institutions failed in attempts to stay afloat.
Threats to the solvency of financial institutions and hedge funds created
fears of systemic risk due to domino effects. The failure of one firm could
trigger the collapse of other institutions because of the complex web of
109
Even perceived risk posed a
counter-party risk created by derivatives.
threat; the contagion of depositor or creditor panic further exacerbated sys110
The failure or threat of failure to these large institutions
temic risk.
prompted extraordinary federal intervention into financial markets.
IV. MITIGATING SYSTEMIC RISK THROUGH CONSUMER PROTECTION
A. Enlisting Consumer Protection as a Tool for Mitigating Systemic Risk
Consumer loans drove securitization and consumer defaults drove the
financial crisis. Part III provides a sketch of the chain that connected defaults on consumer mortgages with the collapse of major financial institu103 Landon Thomas, Jr., Run on Big Wall St. Bank Spurs U.S.-Backed Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
15, 2008, at A1 (describing contagious loss of investor and creditor confidence in U.S. investment
banks).
104 Liz Rappaport & Justin Lahart, Debt Reckoning: U.S. Receives a Margin Call, WALL. ST. J.,
Mar. 15, 2008, at A1.
105 E.g., Jenny Anderson, Hedge Funds Are Squeezed By Investors and Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
20, 2007 at C1.
106 Id.
107 E.g., David Jolly, After Losses, UBS Seeks to Raise $15 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008 at
C5; Eric Dash, IndyMac Announces It Will Close Lending Units and Cut Half of Its Work Force, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2008, at C3.
108 Goldstein & Henry, supra note 102 (reporting on bailout of Bear Stearns); Dash, supra note
107 (reporting on insolvency of IndyMac Bank).
109 Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in Banks, Securities
Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL 15, 22 (Hal S. Scott ed.,
2005) (discussing systemic risk threat posed by securities firms by virtue of OTC derivatives activity).
110 Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Bear Stearns Staves Off Collapse of 2 Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 2007, at C1 (reporting that potential failure of Bear Stearns hedge fund raised investor concerns
over systemic risk).
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tions and threats to global financial markets. This chain also underscores
how adequate consumer financial laws can protect not only consumers from
excessive risk, but markets from excessive systemic risk as well. Had consumers been restricted to mortgages that they could have afforded, the financial crisis may have been less severe or perhaps would never have
started. Mitigating systemic risk adds an altogether different justification
for strong consumer financial laws and vigorous enforcement of those laws.
Consumer financial protection is thus not only about protecting unsophisticated individuals—the proverbial “widows and orphans”—from risky
111
loans, but about protecting financial markets as well.
Consumer financial laws can address systemic risk by working at either end of the securitization chain. Most directly, regulations can address
the practices of lenders by requiring better disclosure to consumers, prohi112
biting certain loan terms, or addressing underwriting standards.
But, as
several legal scholars have noted, consumer protection can also be achieved
113
For
by addressing the demand for asset-backed securities by investors.
example, a legal rule that restricted financial institutions from purchasing
securities backed by mortgages with a high risk of default would dry up the
capital that fed exotic, excessively risky, and exploitative mortgages.
B. The Costs and Tensions of Reorienting Consumer Financial Protection
A detailed proposal for new consumer financial laws is beyond the
scope of this Article (Part IV.F sketches one suggestion). Nonetheless, it is
important to note that strengthening consumer financial protection laws
may come at a cost. Protecting consumers (and financial markets) from
risky loans is in tension with other objectives of consumer and other financial regulation. Most obviously, stronger consumer financial protection
114
may reduce consumer access to credit.

111 U.S. bank regulators seem to be very tentatively recognizing the connection between consumer
protection and safety-and-soundness. Notably, in 2006, the Federal Reserve and other federal bank
regulators issued guidance that suggested to financial institutions that they both make enhanced disclosures to consumers who borrow under exotic mortgages and adopt enhanced underwriting standards for
such mortgages. These recommendations were based on both consumer protection and safety-andsoundness objectives. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., Interagency Guidance on
Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58, 609 (Oct. 4, 2006). However, this guidance
was non-binding.
112 See id. In other words, regulators could clarify and strengthen the standards in the Interagency
Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks and make them binding.
113 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 80; Peterson, supra note 80.
114 Gregory Elliehausen & Michael Staten, Regulation of Subprime Mortgage Products: An Analysis of North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law, 29 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 411 (2004) (finding a
1999 North Carolina statute prohibiting certain “predatory” mortgages caused lenders to sharply restrict
lending to high risk borrowers and arguing against this restricted access to credit).
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Second, as noted above, stronger consumer protection may reduce the
115
profitability of financial institutions. Thus, muscular consumer financial
protection laws may have some theoretical adverse long-term consequences
for systemic risk. In addition, if consumer protection laws would drive
financial institutions out of a broad class of investments, they might also
undermine diversification by those institutions. Yet, it is also important to
reiterate that the threat of consumer financial protection laws to the safety
and soundness of financial institutions remains largely theoretical; there is
scant, hard, empirical evidence that consumer financial protection regulations increase systemic risk.
Nevertheless, reorienting consumer financial laws to protect financial
markets from systemic risk may not mesh completely with the traditional
objective of protecting consumers. Mitigating systemic risk might not necessarily equate with lowering consumer defaults, but instead might focus on
the narrower goals of making defaults more predictable by financial institu116
tions and less correlated.
C. Alternative Explanations: What If Financial Institutions Had Greater
Information on the Risk of Consumer Default?
This raises the question of whether strengthened consumer financial
protection is necessary to prevent a recurrence of the financial crisis.
Would financial institutions be able to mitigate the risk they face from loans
that pose excessive risks to consumers merely by having better quality in117
formation on those loans?
Questions remain as to whether information alone would cause these
investors to refrain from purchasing excessively risky securities backed by
consumer debt. Scholars have argued that managers at institutional investors took on excessive risk with these securities because of misaligned incentives between these managers and the institution’s shareholders and
creditors; poorly designed executive compensation figures prominently in
118
Executives at financial institutions may have faced
this explanation.

115 Levitin, supra notes 9, 43, 44 and accompanying text. This tension mirrors a conundrum that
dogs various potential regulatory responses to the crisis; regulatory measures needed to ensure that the
crisis does not recur are in tension with crisis management and policies that promote the viability of
financial institution in the short-term.
116 Cf. notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
117 The global financial crisis stemmed from multiple failures of markets and regulations; one
alternative policy prescription—that investors in securitizations primarily need better information about
the risks associated with assets underlying securities—has gained particular traction among policymakers and scholars. For example, many proposals focus on improving the quality of rating agency ratings.
See, e.g., Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk after the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach for
Rating Agency Accountability, __ N.C. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2009).
118 See Executive Compensation II: CEO Pay and the Mortgage Crisis: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (Mar. 7 2008) (Testimony of Dr. Susan M.
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some pressure not to resist the herd mentality of financial institutions that
119
drove asset-backed security prices higher; it is a career risk to bet against
a bubble. In addition, even executives and sophisticated traders at financial
institutions may be subject to the same types of behavioral biases that afflict
120
consumers.
The preceding paragraph suggested that agency costs and behavioral
biases may combine to induce individuals at financial institutions to invest
in risky consumer debt even when they are armed with better information
on the risks involved. This argues that consumer financial laws may play a
necessary role in mitigating systemic risk by restricting consumer lending
practices that lead to excessive and highly correlated consumer defaults.
D. “Predatory Lending” as a Commons Problem and Anti-coordination
Game
There is an alternative economic justification for consumer financial
laws that address systemic risk, which is based on the logic of collective
action. Each consumer lender, on its own, lacks sufficient incentives and
ability to curtail lending practices that may exacerbate systemic risk. Each
lender has an incentive to maximize returns from its consumer borrowers
and may be punished with lower market share for doing so. But, these
lending practices, when adopted by many lenders in the market, can lead to
unpredictable, high, and highly correlated defaults by consumers. As noted
121
above, waves of consumer defaults can threaten financial markets. This
represents a classic collective action failure characterized by lenders that
neither bear the full cost of their actions (i.e., their lending practices have
negative externalities) nor are able to coordinate their actions with other
122
lenders to refrain collectively from lending practices. The following paragraphs present several versions of these problems.

Wachter, Richard B. Worley Professor of Financial Management, Professor of Real Estate and Finance,
The
Wharton
School,
University
of
Pennsylvania),
available
at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20080307103022.pdf.
119 See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the 2007-08 Liquidity and Credit Crunch, 23 J.
ECON. PERSP. 77 (2009). Professor Brunnermeier cites the now infamous quote by Citigroup CEO
Charles Prince: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as
the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”
120 See, e.g., Robert A. Olsen, Implications of Herding Behavior for Earnings Estimation, Risk
Assessment, and Stock Returns, 52 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 37 (1996) (finding that expert financial analysts
engage in herding).
121 Supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
122 Professor Schwarcz has characterized all efforts to mitigate systemic risk as a “commons
problem.” Schwarcz, supra note 8.
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Consumer Wealth as Commons
Each individual consumer represents a potential source of revenue for
multiple lenders and, thus, resembles a classic commons. Each lender can
exploit the consumer and extract additional revenue, but the combination of
several exploitative loans may cause the consumer to default. Of course,
lenders can protect themselves before extending a loan by examining the
credit report of a borrower. Credit reports typically contain information on
123
the identity of other lenders, amount borrowed and payment history. But,
they lack detailed information on the terms of outstanding loans, and, as
consumer law scholars have noted, the devil is in those details. Consumer
loan contracts can contain complicated interest rates, penalties or fee provisions that could increase a consumer’s risk of default and, in severe cases,
124
becoming insolvent. But, the complex and often bespoke nature of these
contractual provisions would frustrate including information on them in a
standard credit report. One solution for this critical gap in information,
which might be called the “consumer loan terms information gap,” is discussed below in Part IV.F.
Correlated Consumer Loan Practices and Correlated Consumer Defaults
Lenders face a collective action problem not only with respect to individual borrowers, but also with respect to groups of borrowers in the market. Lenders face a strong incentive to mimic lucrative lending practices—
from types of mortgages to specific provisions in a credit card contract—
125
that other lenders have used to extract value from consumers. But, when
practices of different lenders become highly correlated across the marketplace, consumer defaults may become highly correlated as well, exacerbat126
ing systemic risk.
123 Robert B. Avery, Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit, FED. RES. BULL. 297 (Summer
2004)
(detailing
contents
of
consumer
credit
report),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2004/summer04_credit.pdf.
124 E.g. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1.
125 Supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. See Martin Neil Baily, The Origins of the
Financial Crisis, Initiative on Business & Public Policy at Brookings, Fixing Finance Series Paper 3
(Nov. 2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/11_
origins_crisis_baily_litan/11_origins_crisis_baily_litan.pdf (positing a theory of mortgage originator
behavior based on information cascades and bubble dynamics). The authors of this Brookings study
elaborate on how mortgage originators and other actors in the mortgage markets may have engaged in
herd behavior.
In a marketplace where individuals observe the actions of others, herding behavior may trump the
judgment of rational individuals. This kind of “social contagion” can go a long way in describing how
homeowners, mortgage originators, holders of mortgage-backed securities, regulators, ratings agencies—indeed everyone—could get swept up in a bubble that ex post was clearly bound to burst.
Id. Cf. Raghuram G. Rajan, Why Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence, 109 Q.
J. ECON. 399-442 (1994) (presenting evidence of herding in bank lending standards).
126 Supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
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ARMs and other exotic mortgages in the subprime provide a stark example of correlated lending practices leading to correlated defaults. The
unfolding of the subprime crisis described in Part III.D above also demonstrates how consumer defaults can become even more highly correlated
through spillover effects and feedback loops. Spillover effects occur when
the default on one consumer loan creates direct, negative externalities that
127
increase the probability that other consumers will also default.
For example, data shows that a foreclosed house lowers the value of other houses
128
in the neighborhood A precipitous drop in home value below the value of
mortgages may induce other mortgage borrowers to default. Feedback
loops occur when consumer defaults trigger a series of events that can indirectly lead to a subsequent wave of defaults. Part III.D gives the example
of ARM defaults caused by rising interest rates, which leads to losses by
financial institutions, who cut back lending, which leads to higher interest
rates, which can lead to a new round of ARM defaults. The complexity of
the terms of these consumer mortgages (in addition to the complexity
caused by securitization) combined with these spillover effects and feedback loops makes modeling the risks posed by consumer loans extremely
129
difficult.
Consumer Unpredictability and Behavioral Biases
Modeling and measuring the risks to financial institutions of consumer
loans faces further complications due to the behavioral biases of consum130
ers. To the extent that these behavioral biases play a significant role in
consumer borrowing decisions, they also frustrate the ability of financial
institutions to predict consumer behavior, including consumer defaults.
Behavioral economics has faced a trenchant criticism, most prominently
131
articulated in the legal literature by Professor Gregory Mitchell, that behavioral economics presents general tendencies, but has yet to delineate the
132
boundaries of those tendencies.
In other words, behavioral economics

127 For a lengthy discussion of the spillover effects that might lead to a high degree of correlation
among consumer defaults and defaults on asset-backed securities, see Hellwig, supra note 79.
128 Adam Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy,
2009 WIS. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2009).
129 Gerding, supra note 12.
130 Supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
131 See Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies versus Boundaries: Levels of Generality in Behavioral Law
and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1781 (2003) (arguing that behavioral law and economics proponents
have documented “tendencies” in behavioral biases, but has yet to specify the “boundaries” of those
tendencies, i.e. when, and the extent to which, these biases come into play). See also Richard A. Posner,
Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1559-60 (1998) (faulting
behavioral law and economics scholars for failing to offer a theory capable of generating testable predictions that would rival the predictive power of rational-choice economics).
132 Mitchell, supra note 131, at 1804-11.
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produces evidence that behavioral biases occur, but has not specified when
133
those biases occur.
This failure to specify boundary conditions means
that behavioral economics struggles to produce models of human behavior
134
that can lead to testable predictions.
This criticism applies not only to the modeling of behavioral economics scholars, but to the modeling used by financial institutions to predict
consumer and investor behavior, as well. Prediction of human behavior by
financial institutions is frustrated by the lack of defined boundaries to behavioral biases. This lack of definition obscures the thresholds and magnitude
of the effects of behavioral biases. Thus, the higher the probability that a
behavioral bias will be salient in a given context, the more uncertainty it
135
adds to predictions by financial institutions of consumer behavior.
In fact, evidence from the subprime crisis suggests that even originating mortgage lenders struggled to predict consumer defaults. Insolvencies
and severe losses by mortgage lenders on mortgages that they retained or
136
were unable to offload quickly enough suggest that mortgage originators
severely miscalculated the level and timing of consumer defaults.
The Shape of Consumer Financial Protection: “Menu Design”, Standardization, and Systemic Risk
Scholars have proposed different policies to mitigate the risk that behavioral biases will lead consumers to unwise decisions. A full discussion
of potential changes to consumer lending laws is beyond the scope of this
paper. Nevertheless, one approach to addressing consumer behavioral biases might prove particularly effective in also addressing systemic risk.
Scholars have proposed rules to that address the design of “menus” of con137
tractual choices available to consumers. These rules would not necessarily prevent consumers from entering into unfavorable transactions. Instead,
menu design proposals focus on how information is presented to individu138
als. This could be combined with crafted default rules (including carefully selected opt-in and opt-out provisions) that would counteract or harness
139
the behavioral biases of consumers. Better menu design would dissuade
consumers from agreeing to loan provisions that pose excessive risk. By
133

Id.
Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not be Traded for
Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 122-23 (2002).
135 Gerding, supra note 12.
136 John Kiff & Paul S. Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent Developments in
U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets, (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 07-188, 2007, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07188.pdf.
137 Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (2006).
138 Id.
139 Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1159 (2003).
134
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lowering the risk of unpredictable and highly correlated consumer default,
these provisions would also mitigate systemic risk.
Menu-design proposals would have another benefit for addressing systemic risk by encouraging more standardization in consumer loan contracts.
Greater standardization would address the “consumer loan terms information gap” mentioned above. Again, lenders considering extending a loan to
a consumer may be concerned that the consumer’s existing loan contracts
may contain complex, fine print provisions that increase the risk of the borrower defaulting on multiple loans. Standardization would provide a way
of categorizing these provisions so that they could appear on more nuanced
credit reports.
V. INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS: THE REDESIGN OF THE FINANCIAL
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Beyond substantive reform of specific laws, the link between consumer financial protection and systemic risk also has important implications for
the current debate on redesigning the institutional framework for financial
regulation in the United States (as well as in other countries). The global
financial crisis has sparked calls for dramatically reorganizing the responsibilities of financial regulators. Scholars and policymakers have called variously for a single financial regulator or for a new financial regulator that
140
Alternatively, the “Twin
would oversee all systemic risk regulation.
141
Peaks” model would split regulatory responsibility in two; a consumer
142
regulator would oversee consumer financial protection and a separate
143
regulator would address the safety and soundness.
Arguments for the Twin Peaks model and against a single financial
regulator include that the consumer financial protection and systemic risk
144
Moreover, placregulation are missions that require different expertise.
ing these two missions under the same regulatory umbrella might allow the
agency to bow to political pressure and subtly favor one mission over the
140 See Editorial, It’s the Regulations, Not the Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A30
(criticizing calls for single financial regulator or systemic risk regulator).
141 See Eddy Wymeersch, The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 237 (2007)
(surveying European nation approaches to division of financial regulatory authority).
142 For scholarly proposals for the creation of a federal regulator with consolidated responsibility
for consumer financial protection, see Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1; Heidi Mandanis Schooner,
Structuring the Federal Response to Abuses in Consumer Credit, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 43 (2005).
143 A third alternative would be to have three regulators: one responsible for stability of financial
markets, a second responsible for prudential regulation, and a third for business conduct of financial
firms (including consumer protection). U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT OF A MODERNIZED
FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 137 (Mar. 2008).
144 For a policy analysis of the tradeoffs among the Twin Peaks, single regulator and functional
regulatory models, see Eric J. Pan, Structural Reform of Financial Regulation: The Case of Canada,
Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 250 (Jan. 2009).
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other. As Professor Levitin notes, public choice theory suggests that consumer financial protection is likely to end up on the losing side of that fight.
When conflicts arise on a consumer protection regulation, a smaller number
of financial institutions with a high stake in lower regulation would exercise
more political muscle than a diffuse band of less-informed and less145
organized consumers.
The connections explored in this Article between consumer financial
protection and systemic risk demonstrate the need, at the very least, for
heavy coordination between a consumer financial regulator and a systemic
risk regulator. But, public choice theory again suggests that the consumer
financial regulator may lose in the inevitable interagency conflicts or otherwise be hobbled in carrying out its mission. A systemic risk regulator
may miss the connections between consumer protection and systemic risk.
This argues for statutory provisions that give extra weight to consumer financial protection regulations vis-á-vis perceived conflicts with safety and
soundness regulations.
Yet, there are problems with the larger project of consolidating financial regulation into one, two, or a few neat organizational boxes. The remaining paragraphs of this Article sketch out a few arguments that may run
counter to prevailing wisdom on ways to clear the current thicket of financial regulations.
A. Virtues of Regulatory Diversity
As noted above, high correlations in consumer lending practices create
146
a risk of high correlations in consumer defaults. Similarly, high correlations in the investment portfolios of financial institutions create the risk of
147
market disruptions generating market-wide sell-offs. Correlations in the
behavior of financial institutions thus exacerbate systemic risk.
Ensuring that different financial institutions are subject to different
regulatory regimes can break down these correlations in financial institution
behavior. However, building diversity into regulation requires a holistic
approach, not least because the ability of financial institutions to engage in
regulatory arbitrage—for example, by choosing their regulator or regulatory
148
regime—could undermine the objective of diversity.
Financial institutions may flock to one regulatory regime (perhaps the most permissive or
perhaps the most “efficient”). Regulators may adopt similar regulatory
approaches in order to compete with one another. Even if regulatory diver-

145

Levitin, supra note 9.
See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
148 E.g., supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing ability of national banks to export
home state usury laws).
146

2009]

Link Between Consumer Financial Protection, Systemic Risk

461

sity is hardwired into the system, the free flow of capital might mean that
capital and risk might still remain concentrated in a few firms or in a few
regulatory regimes. In short, breaking the correlation of financial institution practices with regulatory diversity presents challenges.
B. Virtues of Regulatory Redundancy
The calls, particularly in the United States for pruning the thicket of
financial regulators and financial regulators, may ignore the value of some
level of redundancy among regulations and among regulators. If there is
only one regulator responsible for protecting consumers or mitigating systemic risk, a failure by that regulator, whether due to incompetence or regulatory capture, would prove catastrophic. Engineers build some level of
redundancy into any critical architecture, be it a bridge or an information
149
technology system.
Of course, excessive redundancy in the financial regulatory architecture entails serious costs, including the costs mentioned in Part IV.B above
(e.g., lower consumer access to credit and higher burdens on financial institutions). But, leaving a single regulatory line of defense to systemic risk
can prove even more costly, particularly if the threat takes a non-obvious
path, such as the paths this Article outlines between consumer defaults to
systemic risk.
C. Arguments Against Preemption
The preceding paragraphs discuss the virtues of regulatory diversity
and regulatory redundancy in a theoretical context. But, they can have
more immediate and concrete applications. For example, these virtues argue for giving both consumer regulators and systemic risk regulators overlapping responsibility for regulating lending practices that might transfer
excessive risk to consumers. These two virtues also argue for a continued
role of state consumer financial regulations in addition to federal regulation
150
and against blanket federal preemption of state consumer law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The subprime crisis has demonstrated the need to see protection of
consumers from excessively risky credit products as a fundamental tool for
mitigating systemic risk. This additional role for consumer protection adds
to the quiver of policymakers, scholars, and advocates who have been concerned with diluted and under-enforced consumer financial laws.
149 See, e.g., ROY BILLINTON & RONALD N. ALLAN, RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF ENGINEERING
SYSTEMS: CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 85-86 (1992) (analyzing reliability of parallel systems).
150 See supra notes 25-29, 46-50 and accompanying text.
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This Article attempted merely to sketch the connection between consumer protection and systemic risk and begin to draw out some of the substantive and institutional regulatory implications of this connection. But,
several key avenues for research remain, including the following:
x Providing more empirical evidence of correlations among subprime
lending products and practices in the last 15 years;
x Considering whether ongoing consolidation in the financial sector
will further increase correlations in consumer defaults;
x Investigating consumer default correlations and their causes, particularly during the subprime crisis;
x Fleshing out how menu-design and a default rule may address behavioral biases in consumer credit decisions, make consumer behavior more predictable, and protect consumers; and
x Analyzing whether particular state laws were effective in reducing
consumer defaults in subprime markets or making defaults less correlated.

